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Abstract The fairness of a secure multi-party quantum key agreement (MQKA)
protocol requires that all involved parties are entirely peer entities and can equally
influence the outcome of the protocol to establish a shared key wherein no one can
decide the shared key alone. However, it is found that parts of the existing MQKA
protocols are sensitive to collusion attacks, i.e., some of the dishonest participants
can collaborate to predetermine the final key without being detected. In this paper,
a multi-party QKA protocol resisting collusion attacks is proposed. Different from
previous QKA protocol resistingN−1 coconspirators or resisting 1 coconspirators,
we investigate the general circle-type MQKA protocol which can be secure against
t dishonest participants’ cooperation. Here, t < N . We hope the results of the
presented paper will be helpful for further research on fair MQKA protocols.
Keywords Quantum key agreement · collusive attacks · fairness
1 Introduction
Key distribution (KD) allows two authorized participants to establish a shared
secret key over a public channel. The shared key can be used for secure commu-
nication or authentication protocols. Key agreement (KA) is another important
way to establish keys. Compared with the key distribution, in which one party
distributes a secret key to the other, all involved parties in a key agreement pro-
tocol can equally influence the outcome of the protocol, and no one or a subset
of the group can decide the shared key alone. One main difference between key
agreement and key distribution is that, key agreement protocols not only need
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to resist adversaries from the outside world, but also are required to prevent the
participant attacks.
The security of the classical key agreement protocols are mainly based on
the Deffie-Hellman problem or discrete logarithm problem. With the development
of quantum computers and the polynomial-time quantum algorithms for prime
factorization and discrete logarithm [1], the security of classical key agreement
protocols have become increasingly vulnerable.
Quantum cryptography, which is based on the quantum mechanical, provides
another way for secure key distribution. Since it can provide unconditional security.
It has been developed quickly and become a hot topic in cryptography, such as
quantum secret sharing[2,3], quantum secure direct communication[4,5], quantum
private comparison[6,7,8,9,10] and quantum oblivious transfer [11]. Quantum key
agreement (QKA) is a new branch of quantum cryptography. Since it was first
proposed by Zhou et al. in 2004 [12], lots of QKA protocols have been proposed.
In the previously works, only two participants were involved in the QKA protocols
[13,14,15,16,17,18]. Recently, an enhanced interest on multi-party QKA protocols
has been observed [19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28].
Fairness is an important standard needed to be considered in a secure quantum
key agreement protocol. However, it found that most of the quantum key agree-
ment protocols cannot resist collusive attacks [29], i.e., parts of the participants of
the group can predetermine the shared key before the end of the protocol. Thus,
how to construct a fair and secure key agreement protocol has obtained much
attentions.
In this paper, we propose a multiparty quantum key agreement protocol which
can resist general collusion attacks. The proposed protocol is based on the idea
of our previous multi-party QKA protocol [27]. And the main contribution of the
paper is that we present a general way to construct a secure multi-party QKA
which can resist t coconspirators. We hope the results of the presented paper will
be helpful for further research on fair MQKA protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sect.2 first introduces the formal-
ization of the circle-type multi-party QKA (CT-MQKA) protocols, and the collu-
sion attacks on the CT-MQKA protocols[29]. Then, we present the MQKA proto-
col against collusion attacks. Precisely speaking, the presented protocol, which is
the generalization of the MQKA protocol in Ref. [27], can resist t coconspirators.
Here, t < N , where N is the number of the participants in the MQKA proto-
col. The security and efficiency analyses are given in Sect.3. Sect.4 gives a short
conclusion.
2 Multi-party quantum key agreement protocol
We first introduce the formalization of the circle-type multiparty quantum key
agreement (CT-MQKA) protocols, and the collusion attacks to the CT-MQKA
proposed by Liu [29]. Then, we show that the CT-MQKA protocols can be used
as sub-protocol to construct secure multiparty QKA against collusion attacks.
Usually, suppose there are N participants P0, · · · , PN−1, and they have secret bit
strings keys K0, · · · ,KN−1, respectively. We denote ”⊞” as addition modular N ,
and ”⊟” as subtraction modular N , just like the Ref. [29] does.
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2.1 Brief review of the CT-MQKA protocol
At the beginning of the protocol, Pi prepares a sequence of entangled states and
divides each entangled states into two parts, one of which will be kept, ”the home
qubit sequence”, and the other will be sent out, ”the travel qubit sequence”. And,
we denote the home qubit sequence as Ri, and travel qubit sequence as Si, respec-
tively, where i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1.
Then all the Sis are transmitted in the same direction in the circle. When all
the participants Pi⊞1 have received Si, they do the detection and encode their
secret keys in the received sequences. Afterwards, they continue to send the above
sequence to the next participants. One by one, all the participants will continue
the above process. When each travel qubit sequences is sent back to the participant
who generated it, i.e., the travel qubit sequence finishes a complete circle, Pi can
measure Ri and Si to get the bitwise exclusive OR results of all the other partic-
ipant’ secret keys. Finally, they can calculate the final key Kfinal =
⊗i=N−1
i=0 Ki.
For the convenience of description, we briefly describe the CT-MQKA protocols
of Ref.[21], which is secure against single participant’s attack. In Ref.[21], the whole
process of the CT-MQKA is divided into N periods.
In the first period, each Pi prepares Ri and Si
1, and sends Si to Pi⊞1. When
each Pi⊞(k−1) receives Si, the k-th period starts. In the k-th period, each Pi⊞(k−1)
performs the detection processes with Pi⊞(k−2) to detect the possible attacks on
Si. Then, each Pi⊞(k−1) encodes his/her secret key Ki⊞(k−1) on Si, and inserts
some decoy states in it and sends it to Pi⊞k. When the k-th period ends, the k+1
period starts. Here, k = 2, 3, · · · , N − 1.
In the N -th period (a complete circle is finished), each Pi performs the attacks
detection with Pi⊟1 as before. After that, the bitwise exclusive OR result of the
others’ secret keys can be obtained by measuring Ri and Si. Pi performs the
bitwise exclusive OR operation between the above result and Ki to get the final
key Kfinal.
2.2 Liu’s collusive attacks against CT-MQKA protocol
Liu’s collusive attacks can be divided into two stages: the key stealing stage and
the key flipping stage [29]. In the key stealing stage, the collusive participants try
to get the bitwise exclusive OR result of the others’ secret key in some novel way.
Then, they try to flip the encoded secret keys according to the above result to
control the final key in the key flipping stage.
And, Ref.[29] shows that any two participants Pn and Pm (n > m) are enough
to totally control the final key, as long as their position in the circle satisfy the
following conditions:
n−m =
N
2
for an even N; (1)
n−m =
N − 1
2
or
N + 1
2
for an odd N. (2)
1 For the single state, it can be considered as the entangled states where parts of them Ri
have already been measured.
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When the above conditions are satisfied, Pn and Pm perform the following
collusion attacks:
1. The key stealing stage:
– In the first period, Pn and Pm share all the information about Rn, Sn, Kn
and Rm, Sm, Km and the value of the expected key Kexpected.
– In the (n−m)-th period which started by Pm, Pn has received the travel
sequence Sm. Combined with the shared information about Rm, Sm, Pn can
obtain the bitwise exclusive OR result of the secret keyKm+1,Km+2, · · · ,Kn−1
by measuring Rm and Sm. Similarly, Pm can get the bitwise exclusive OR
result of the secret key Kn+1,Kn+2, · · · , Km−1 by measuring Rn and Sn
in the (N − n+m)-th period which started by Pn.
– Pn (Pm) sends the above bitwise exclusive OR result to Pm (Pn) immedi-
ately he/she gets it.
2. The key flipping stage: In the N2 period (for the convenience of description
of the collusion attacks, suppose N is an even number), each of Pn and Pm gets
the bitwise exclusive OR result of half of the others’ secret key. After exchang-
ing with each other, they get the legal final keyKfinal ahead of others. Then Pn
and Pm can predetermine the final key by encodeK
′
n = Kn+Kexpected+Kfinal
instead of Kn, and K
′
m = Km+Kexpected+Kfinal instead of Km respectively
in the rest periods. It can be verified that, in the last period, for any participant
Pi, he/she will get the final key is K
′
final = Kexpected.
2.3 Multi-party QKA protocol against t coconspirators
Recently, Sun et. al. proposed a novel multi-party quantum key agreement protocol
by using entangled states [27], which is secure against 2 collusion attackers. In their
protocol, each participant sends out two sequences, instead of one sequence in CT-
MQKA. Each of the two sequences ”runs” half circle. Two collusive participants
cannot succeed any more by using Liu’s collusion attacks. Because each of them can
only get the bitwise exclusive OR result of half of the other’s personal keys after the
last period, which leaves no time for them to flip the others’ sequences. However,
when three participants collaborate with each other, they can be succeed. Thus,
Sun et. al.’s protocol can be only secure against 2 coconspirators. Even though
more than two participants can succeed in attacking Sun et. al.’s MQKA protocol,
it provides a new perspective for in-depth analysis of multi-party QKA protocols
secure against collusion attacks.
Suppose there are N participants involved in the multi-party QKA protocol.
And, we hope it can resist t dishonest participants’ cooperation, where t ≤ N2 . And
the N participants are arranged uniformly in the circle. The proposed multi-party
QKA protocol against t coconspirators is described as follows.
1. In the first period, each Pi prepares t sequences of entangled states, and divides
each entangled states into two parts (R0i , S
0
i ), · · · , (R
t−1
i , S
t−1
i )
2, respectively,
and sends S0i to Pi⊞1, S
1
i to Pi⊞⌊N
t
⌋⊞1, · · · , S
t−1
i to Pi⊞⌊ (t−1)N
t
⌋⊞1
. Here, ⌊x⌋
represents the maximum integer which is not more than x. For the convenience
2 For the single state, it can be considered as the entangled states where parts of them have
already been measured.
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Fig. 1 We give an example for t = 4, i.e., the MQKA can resist 4 collusive attackers. The
circle is divided into 4 parts, the red part, the blue part, the yellow part and the green part.
Each part is a complete sub-circle when Si is returned back to Pi.
of description, we simply write N
t
instead of ⌊N
t
⌋. Note that Pi divides the circle
into t parts, each part has N
t
participants.
2. Detection phase When each Pi⊞(k−1) receives S
0
i , Pi⊞N
t
⊞(k−1) receives S
1
i ,
· · · , P
i⊞
(t−1)N
t
⊞(k−1)
receives St−1i , respectively, the k-th period starts. Here,
k = 2.
In the k-th period, each Pi⊞(k−1) first performs the detection processes with
Pi⊞(k−2) to detect the possible attacks on S
0
i , Pi⊞N
t
⊞(k−1) first performs the
detection processes with Pi⊞N
t
⊞(k−2) to detect the possible attacks on S
1
i , · · · ,
P
i⊞
(t−1)N
t
⊞(k−1)
first performs the detection processes with P
i⊞
(t−1)N
t
⊞(k−2)
to
detect the possible attacks on St−1i , respectively.
Note that, in the second period, Pi⊞1, Pi⊞N
t
⊞1, · · · , Pi⊞ (t−1)N
t
⊞1
perform de-
tection process with Pi, instead of their former participant in the circle, to
detect the possible attacks.
3. Encoding Phase When all the sequences are secure, each Pi⊞(k−1) encodes
his/her secret key Ki⊞(k−1) in S
0
i , and inserts some decoy states in it and
sends it to Pi⊞k, Pi⊞N
t
⊞(k−1) encodes his/her secret key Ki⊞N
t
⊞(k−1) in S
1
i ,
and inserts some decoy states in it and sends it to Pi⊞N
t
⊞k, · · · , Pi⊞ (t−1)N
t
⊞(k−1)
encodes his/her secret key K
i⊞
(t−1)N
t
⊞(k−1)
in St−1i , and inserts some decoy
states in it and sends it to P
i⊞
(t−1)N
t
⊞k
, respectively.
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4. The parties sequentially execute eavesdropping check and the encoding pro-
cesses in the same way as participants did in steps 2 and 3. When the k-th
period ends, the k + 1 period starts. Here, k = 2, · · · , N
t
.
5. In the N
t
+ 1-th period (a complete sub-circle is finished, for example Fig.1),
each Pi⊞N
t
, Pi⊞ 2N
t
, · · · , Pi⊞t⌊N
t
⌋ performs the attacks detection with Pi, re-
spectively, After that, the bitwise exclusive OR result of the others’ secret keys
can be obtained by measuring (R0i , S
0
i ), · · · , (R
t−1
i , S
t−1
i ). Pi performs the bit-
wise exclusive OR operation between the above result and Ki to get the final
key Kfinal.
3 Security and Efficiency analysis
In this section, we will give the security and efficiency analysis of the proposed
multi-party QKA protocol.
3.1 Security analysis
We first consider t > N2 . When N > t >
N
2 , we have 1 <
N
t
< 2, i.e., ⌊N
t
⌋ = 1.
In this case, the circle will be divided into N parts, each part has 1 participant.
Then, this kind of CT-MQKA protocol becomes the complete-graph-type MQKA
(CGT-MQKA) protocol [18,20,23], which has been proven fair against both single
and collusion attacks.
When t < N2 . For the simplest case t = 1, the proposed multi-party QKA
protocol becomes the standard circle-type multi-party QKA (CT-MQKA) protocol
[21,22,26], which has been proven that it is secure against single participant attack.
For the general case, the security analysis is similar to the security analysis of
the MQKA protocol resisting 2 coconspirators [27]. As we know, Liu’s collusive
attacks can be divided into two stages: the key stealing stage and the key flipping
stage. In the key stealing stage, the collusive participants try to get the bitwise
exclusive OR result of the others’ secret key. Then, they can flip the encoded secret
keys according to the above result to control the final key in the key flipping stage.
In order to resist Liu’s collusion attacks, the key stealing stage or the key flipping
stage must be destroyed. It can be verified that the proposed protocol cannot
resist collusion attack at the key stealing stage. In other words, t participants,
in the special positions of the circle, can get the final key ahead of others, by
using Liu’s collusion attacks. However, when the key stealing stage is finished,
the whole protocol is also accomplished, i.e., the collusive participants have no
time to flip the encoded secret keys. The key flipping stage is destroyed. Thus,
the t coconspirators cannot predetermine the final key any more. For the precise
security analysis, it can refer to Ref. [20,27].
3.2 Efficiency analysis
We use the qubit efficiency to measure the efficiency of the proposed MQKA
protocol. The qubit efficiency was introduced by Cabello [30] in 2000, which is
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given as
η =
c
q + b
, (3)
where c denotes the length of the transmitted message bits (the length of the final
key), q is the number of the used qubits, and b is the number of classical bits
exchanged for decoding of the message (classical communication used for checking
of eavesdropping is not counted).
In order to generate n bits of shared key, each party has to prepare t.n single
photons and κt.n decoy particles in the proposed protocol. There is no classical bits
exchanged for decoding of the shared key. Hence, the qubit efficiency of proposed
protocol can be computed, η = n(tn+κtn)N =
1
(κ+1)tN , where κ is the detection rate
and N is the number of the participants. It can be verified that when t = N − 1,
the qubit efficiency is 1(κ+1)N(N−1) , which is identical to the qubit efficiency of
Ref. [20]. This also implies that the proposed protocol is a general case of MQKA
protocol resisting t coconspirators.
4 Conclusion
In conclusion, we propose a multiparty quantum key agreement protocol which can
resist collusion attacks which is presented in the Ref. [29]. The proposed protocol
is based on the idea of our multi-party QKA protocol which can resist 2 coconspir-
ators [27]. And the main contribution of the paper is that we present a general way
to construct a secure multi-party QKA which can resist t participants collaborat-
ing to predetermine the final key, which protects the honest participants’ fairness.
We hope the results of the presented paper will be helpful for further research on
more secure and more fair MQKA protocols.
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